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Abstract A key obstacle to reducing payroll taxes in many industrialized and transi-
tion countries is the direct revenue loss to the government that it implies. This paper
studies a simple and practical labor tax reform of reducing a payroll tax and increas-
ing a progressive wage tax that keeps the marginal tax wedge unchanged. Such a
strategy increases employment, reduces the equilibrium unemployment rate, and in-
creases public revenue as long as workers do not have all the bargaining power in
wage negotiations. Moreover, welfare rises if workers’ bargaining power is suffi-
ciently large to exceed a critical value determined by the second-best Hosios con-
dition.
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1 Introduction
Labor tax reform continues to be a key item on the policy agenda of many Euro-
pean countries. High labor tax wedges—generally defined as the difference between
the gross wage firms are paying and the after-tax wage income of workers—are of-
ten seen as one of the culprits of the high equilibrium unemployment rates of these
countries. A piecemeal reduction in the marginal tax wedge is, therefore, a common
measure found in European tax reform programs aimed at stimulating employment.
In particular, policy makers have recommended cuts in payroll taxes to reduce unem-
ployment (e.g., OECD 1994).1
Some observers (e.g., Symons and Robertson 1990) argue that the composition of
the tax wedge matters for employment and real wages. They argue that shifting the
composition of the tax wedge from payroll taxes (i.e., the employer’s part of labor
taxes) to wage taxes (i.e., the employee’s part of labor taxes) could increase em-
ployment.2 Indeed, in view of governments’ revenue needs, several OECD countries
have taken this approach in reforming their direct tax system. For example, Hungary
cut its employers’ social insurance contribution rates by 11 percentage points during
1994–1999, while increasing its effective labor income tax rates from 24% to 28%.
Several other central and eastern European countries—featuring high rates of unem-
ployment and overstretched public finances—still have to decide on their structural
reform strategies. A pivotal policy question is whether a shift in the composition of
the tax wedge would be of help in alleviating the unemployment and budgetary prob-
lems of these countries.
As a matter of general principle, it is well known that in perfectly competitive labor
markets the “invariance of tax incidence proposition” holds.3 This proposition says
that it does not matter to gross wages, net wages, and employment whether (statutory)
labor taxes are levied on workers or firms.4 It is not immediately evident, however,
whether wage taxes and payroll taxes are equivalent in an imperfectly competitive
labor market. For example, unions are unlikely to accept a wage reduction to offset
an increase in payroll taxes, but may agree to refrain from wage increases if wage
taxes are increased. Empirical evidence is mixed and sensitive to the time dimension.
Studies employing wage-bargaining models (e.g., Lockwood and Manning 1993;
Holm et al. 1994) suggest that payroll and wage taxes have quite differing effects
1Empirical studies on the employment effects of payroll taxes generally find small negative effects (see
Hamermesh 1993). Summers (1989) argues that the effect may even be negligible if workers value the
associated benefits (i.e., health care services, unemployment protection, and pension allowances) enough
so that they are willing to accept a lower wage in combination with these benefits. In the present paper,
payroll taxes are considered to be akin to a tax.
2Throughout the paper, we define wage taxes to include all labor taxes levied on employees’ wages (includ-
ing employees’ social security contributions), whereas payroll taxes are defined to refer to social security
contributions levied on employers.
3The invariance of tax incidence proposition is also sometimes called “Dalton’s law” (Dalton 1954) or
“tax liability side equivalence.” See Riedl and Tyran (2005).
4This raises the question why, in practice, social security contributions are divided between employers and
employees. Musgrave and Musgrave (1987) argue that the legislative intent may have been to share the tax
burden equally, although this does not say anything about the economic incidence. Other factors may play
a role as well such as liability to tax evasion and tax administration concerns.
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on wage formation. Some studies find that a shift from payroll taxes to wage taxes
decreases firms’ wage costs, but others cannot find a significant effect (see Symons
and Robertson 1990). The composition of the tax wedge seems to play more of a role
in the short run than in the long run (cf. Leibfritz et al. 1997), reflecting the greater
flexibility of production factors in the long run.
The analytical literature offers surprisingly little guidance on what kind of labor
tax reform policy makers should employ to reduce equilibrium unemployment with-
out putting the government’s revenue position at risk. Only a few formal studies have
studied the invariance of tax incidence proposition in a setting of imperfectly com-
petitive labor markets (cf. Koskela and Schöb 1999; Picard and Toulemonde, 2001,
2003). In such a framework, households and firms may have different degrees of bar-
gaining power over wages, and, therefore, differ in their ability to shift labor taxes.
Koskela and Schöb (1999) and Picard and Toulemonde (2001) employ “right-to-
manage” trade union models5 and find that a revenue-neutral substitution of propor-
tional wage taxes for payroll taxes has no effect on employment. However, Koskela
and Schöb (1999)—building on the partial equilibrium frameworks of Koskela and
Vilmunen (1996) and Pissarides (1998)—show that positive employment effects are
obtained if wage taxes are progressive. So far, little attention has been paid to labor tax
reform in search-theoretic models of the labor market.6 A notable exception is Picard
and Toulemonde (2003), who analyze the employment effects of a revenue-neutral
labor tax reform when labor taxes are nonlinear. These authors, however, neither fo-
cus on the welfare effects of labor tax reform (reflecting the partial equilibrium nature
of their analysis) nor endogenize the labor force participation decision.
The aim of the paper is to analyze the allocation and welfare effects of a coordi-
nated reform that reduces payroll taxes and increases progressive wage taxes. Rather
than focusing on revenue-neutral tax reforms, as is common in the public economics
literature, we consider a strategy of keeping the marginal tax wedge constant. Our
approach allows us to focus on the composition of the tax wedge, and thus abstracts
from the effects of a change in the level of the tax wedge. Besides being analyt-
ically convenient, this strategy is also practical. Compared with a revenue-neutral
restructuring—which requires an analysis of complex tax base effects—all that is
needed is information on marginal tax rates.
We embed a standard search-theoretic framework along the lines of Pissarides
(1990) in a micro-founded macroeconomic model of a small open economy, which
features a perfectly competitive goods market.7 The search-theoretic component of
the model features flows in the labor market from the (endogenous) creation of new
jobs and the (exogenous) destruction of existing jobs. It is assumed that job-seeking
workers and vacancy-offering firms match in a stochastic fashion. This modeling
setup gives rise to a search externality, which is represented by agents’ contact prob-
abilities as a function of labor market tightness. Search externalities yield a subop-
5In this setup, firms bargain with unions over the wage subject to the restriction that employment is on the
labor demand curve. See also Heijdra and Van der Ploeg (2002, Chap. 8).
6Boone and Bovenberg (2002) employ the search and matching framework to study the optimal design of
labor taxes. Issues of tax design are beyond the scope of the present study.
7See Rogerson et al. (2005) for a survey of search-theoretic models of the labor market.
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timal decentralized market outcome in which vacancies and unemployment coexist.
Because of preexisting labor taxes, the market outcome is second best.
We have chosen to employ a micro-founded macroeconomic framework for three
reasons. First, it allows us to endogenize labor supply along the extensive margin (i.e.,
the labor force participation decision). The majority of the search literature, however,
assumes exogenous labor supply.8 By modeling endogenous labor supply and al-
lowing for preexisting labor taxes, we are able to study tax incidence issues taking
into account both the supply and demand side of the labor market. More specifically,
we employ a linear tax scheme with an income threshold to study the effects of tax
progressivity on employment, unemployment, and full consumption. Second, by ex-
plicitly modeling household behavior, we can study the welfare effects of tax reform.
So far, studies have not addressed welfare issues in a search and matching context.
Indeed, such an analysis would be trivial in the standard framework because of the as-
sumptions of risk-neutral households (i.e., utility is linear in private consumption) and
exogenous labor supply. Finally, the small open economy context provides a justifica-
tion for an exogenously given (and fixed) rate of interest. Many of the smaller Euro-
pean countries face such an external environment. Furthermore, in the absence of in-
terest rate effects, we can characterize the allocation and welfare effects analytically.
Our approach is shown to yield efficiency gains—in terms of a smaller search ex-
ternality to job-seeking workers, giving rise to higher employment—without jeopar-
dizing public revenue if the wage tax structure is progressive. Indeed, public revenue
is shown to rise. Moreover, such a reform yields an increase in welfare if workers
have a sufficient amount of bargaining power. If labor supply is exogenous, a suf-
ficient condition to yield a welfare improvement is that workers’ bargaining power
should be larger than or equal to the first-best optimal value (which follows from the
Hosios (1990) condition). The necessary condition for welfare improvement, how-
ever, implies a much smaller degree of workers’ bargaining power than prescribed
by the sufficiency condition. If labor supply is endogenous, more complex conditions
are needed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the basic search-theoretic
model, which is extended for endogenous labor supply. Section 3 closes the model,
derives equilibrium conditions, and presents the graphical framework used in analyz-
ing the reform. Section 4 studies the allocation and revenue effects of the labor tax
reform experiment. Section 5 presents the welfare effects. Section 6 concludes.
2 Search and matching in a small open economy
This section embeds a standard search-theoretic model of the labor market in a micro-
founded macroeconomic model, which incorporates endogenous labor supply and
various labor tax instruments. The sequencing of agents’ decisions is as follows. The
8Notable exceptions are Pissarides (2000), Heijdra and Ligthart (2002), and Shapiro (2004), who endo-
genize labor supply along the extensive margin. In contrast to Pissarides (2000), Heijdra and Ligthart’s
specification of the utility function is very different; it is concave in private consumption and leisure and
explicitly features the labor supply elasticity. The contributions of Hansen (1999) and Shi and Wen (1999)
consider endogenous labor supply along the intensive margin (i.e., the working hours decision).
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government sets tax policy in the first stage. Subsequently, workers and firms search
for a suitable match. After parties have been matched, workers and firms bargain over
the wage.
2.1 Firms
The production side of the economy consists of a large number of risk-neutral firms,
each of which is producing a homogeneous good under perfect competition. For con-
venience, the number of firms is fixed and normalized to unity. The representative
firm produces output, Y , according to Y = αL, where L denotes units of labor time
and α > 0 is a constant productivity index. For simplicity, physical capital is ab-
stracted away.9 The firm’s labor stock adjusts sluggishly because it has to post vacan-
cies, V , and find workers to fill them. New employment is defined as the difference
between job creation, qV , and job destruction, sL:
L˙ ≡ qV − sL, 0 < q < 1, (1)
where q represents the probability of the firm finding an unemployed worker with
whom it concludes a deal (and thus 1/q is the expected duration of a vacancy, see
Sect. 2.4) and s is the exogenous job destruction rate.10 A dot above a variable de-
notes a time derivative (e.g., L˙ ≡ dL(t)/dt). For convenience, time subscripts have
been dropped where no confusion arises.






Y(z) − γV (z) − wP (z)L(z)
]
e−r(z−t) dz, γ > 0, (2)
where AP is the value of the firm, γ is the (constant) flow cost per vacancy (modeled
in terms of output lost), wP ≡ w(1 + τE) denotes the producer wage, w is the before-
tax wage, and τE is an ad valorem payroll tax. The rate of interest, r , is exogenously
given, reflecting that the domestic economy is small in world capital markets.
The firm is assumed to have perfect foresight. It chooses time paths of employment
and vacancies in order to maximize (2) subject to the production function and the










AP = λEL. (4)
The first equality of (3) shows that the firm chooses its vacancy supply such that
the value of an additional worker (i.e., λE) is equalized to the expected recruitment
costs (i.e., γ /q). The second equality of (3) indicates that the value of an additional
9Exogenous capital is a standard assumption in search-theoretic models.
10The assumption of a constant job break-up rate is not too unrealistic for purposes of comparative statics,
but less suitable if one wants to study short-run dynamics. The present paper focuses on the former, how-
ever. See Merz (1997) and Mortensen and Pissarides (2003) for a model endogenizing the job break-up
rate.
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worker is equal to the present discounted value of the surplus the firm earns on that
job, using r + s as the effective discount rate. The presence of search costs causes
α > wP. Equation (4) says that the value of the firm, AP, should be equal to the
replacement value of its labor force.
2.2 Households
The representative household comprises infinitely many members caring only about
the lifetime utility enjoyed by the household unit at time t . At a given point in time,
household members engage in only one of the following activities: working, search-
ing for a job (if unemployed), or enjoying leisure. The overall household has a fixed
time endowment—which is normalized to unity for convenience—so that leisure is
defined as M ≡ 1 − U − L, where U denotes units of time spent on searching for a
job. Each household member supplies a fixed amount of labor time while employed,
which is in line with the empirical regularity that labor supply is more responsive
along the extensive margin than along the intensive margin (see Heckman 1993).
The search effort of an unemployed household member is also supplied inelasti-
cally. Individual household members experience income risk in the labor market,
due to idiosyncratic shocks, which is fully insured within the household. Since there
are infinitely many members, household income is nonstochastic (cf. Merz 1995;
Andolfatto 1996).






where X is full consumption, which is defined as the sum of the value of goods con-
sumption and the opportunity cost of leisure consumption. We have already imposed
that the household’s pure rate of time preference is equal to the rate of interest.11 Fol-
lowing Greenwood et al. (1988), the full consumption subutility functional is speci-
fied so as to eliminate the wealth effect in the household’s labor force participation
decision:
X ≡ C − σ
σ + 1L
(σ+1)/σ
P , σ ≥ 0, (6)
where C is private consumption, LP ≡ U + L denotes labor force participation, and
σ is the intratemporal labor supply elasticity. Labor supply is exogenous if σ = 0 and
endogenous if σ > 0.
At each instant of time, fU unemployed household members find a job, but
some employed members, sL, lose their job owing to idiosyncratic shocks. Then,
the household’s stock of employment evolves according to:
L˙ ≡ fU − sL, 0 < f < 1, (7)
where f denotes the firm’s worker-finding rate (to be determined in Sect. 2.4).
11As is well known, the representative-agent model for the small open economy only has a meaningful
steady-state solution if this “knife-edge” condition is met. If the rate of interest were to exceed (fall short
of) the pure rate of time preference, the economy would keep accumulating (decumulating) assets.
88 B.J. Heijdra, J.E. Ligthart
Employed household members pay a wage tax, τL, that is levied on their wage in-
come above a certain threshold a ≥ 0, which represents the personal tax allowance.12
After-tax wage income then amounts to (wN + τLa)L, where wN = w(1 − τL) de-
notes the after-tax “marginal” wage and wA = wN +τLa is the after-tax “average” (or
consumer) wage. Unemployed workers receive a constant unemployment benefit, b,
which is untaxed.13 The household’s flow budget identity (measured in real terms) is:
A˙ ≡ rA + [wN + τLa]L + bU + T − C, (8)
where A is the stock of financial assets and T are lump-sum transfers.
The optimization problem of the household can be solved in two stages. In the
first stage, the optimal time profile of full consumption is solved by maximizing (5)
subject to the household’s budget constraint (8) and the relevant transversality con-
ditions. This yields flat full consumption profiles. Hence, X = r(A + H), implying
that the household consumes a constant proportion of its total wealth, comprising







L(z) + bU(z) − σ
1 + σ wR(z)




In the second step, full consumption is optimally allocated over its components:
U + L = wσR, (10)













s + f (ν) + r)dν
]
dz, (12)
where wR is the worker’s reservation wage and λL is the pecuniary value of an addi-
tional job. Equation (10) shows that labor market participation is a positive (nonlin-
ear) function of the reservation wage (11), which is defined as the sum of the unem-
ployment benefit and the expected value of a job, f λL. The value of an additional job
(12) is the present discounted value of the “dividend” earned on the job, consisting of
the excess of net labor income over the household’s outside option.14
2.3 The government
Lump-sum transfers to households, T , and outlays on unemployment benefits, bU ,
are covered by revenue from a payroll tax and a wage tax:
T + bU = [τEw + τL(w − a)]L. (13)
Interest income, rA, is untaxed.
12In the background, we employ the linear tax function: Γ ≡ τL(w − a)L, where a ≥ 0. If a = 0, the tax
system is proportional, otherwise, it is progressive. Note that a is subtracted from the wage income of each
household member rather than the wage income of the entire household. See Sect. 2.3.
13Our key results on efficiency and employment still hold if unemployment benefits were taxed.
14Assumption 1(i) (see below) guarantees that wN(z) + τLa > b.
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In line with general practice, wage taxes are taken to be progressive, whereas
payroll taxes are assumed to be proportional. To measure the degree of tax progres-
siveness, we use the coefficient of average tax progression:
Ψ (τE, τL, a) ≡ τM − τA = τLa
w(1 + τE) , (14)
where τM denotes the marginal tax wedge and τA is the average tax wedge:
τM ≡ τL + τE
1 + τE , τ
A ≡ τM − τLa
wP
. (15)
We thus define the marginal tax wedge as the difference between the wage paid by
the firm and the wage received by the household expressed as a percentage of the
producer wage.15 The tax system is progressive (i.e., the average tax burden rises
with the wage rate) if Ψ (·) > 0, which is satisfied for a > 0. We obtain a proportional
tax system for a = 0. An increase in one of the wage tax parameters (τL or a) at a
given wage rate yields an increase in average tax progression, whereas an increase
in the payroll tax reduces average tax progression ceteris paribus. Tax progression
can also change owing to a change in the wage at a given tax rate, which is further
analyzed in Sect. 4.
We take the design of the tax system as given. The tax-benefit system satisfies:
Assumption 1 (i) w(1 − τL) + τLa > b; (ii) b > a > τLa ≥ 0; and (iii) 0 <
τE, τL < 1.
Part (i) ensures that it pays off for household members to work. Part (ii) guarantees
a positive tax-adjusted unemployment benefit, that is, b − τLa > 0. Furthermore, in
keeping with OECD practice, unemployment benefits are assumed to exceed personal
tax allowances, that is, b > a. Finally, part (iii) imposes positive initial taxes and
precludes an outcome in which wage income is fully taxed away, which would leave
employed households with a constant income equal to the personal tax allowance.
2.4 Job matching
Following Pissarides (1990), firms with vacancies and job-seeking workers are
matched in a stochastic fashion. The Cobb–Douglas matching function, Z =
UεV 1−ε , 0 < ε < 1, describes the number of labor contracts, Z, that are concluded
given the number of job seekers and vacancies. From the matching function, the
job-finding rate of the worker can be derived:16
f (θ) ≡ Z
U
= θ1−ε, f ′ ≡ df/dθ > 0, f ′′ < 0, (16)
15Defining the tax wedge with respect to the producer wage is common in the academic literature (e.g.,
Koskela and Schöb 1999) and policy literature (e.g., OECD 1994).
16On the one hand, f (θ) represents the fraction of individuals finding a job per unit of time. On the other
hand, it represents the probability of an individual finding work. The former follows logically from the
latter by the law of large numbers.
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where θ ≡ V/U is the relative number of traders in the market, which is an indi-
cator of labor market tightness. It holds that f (θ) = θq(θ), where q(θ) ≡ Z/V
and q ′ < 0 < q ′′. Intuitively, a tighter labor market reduces the probability for
firms to fill a vacancy but makes it easier for workers to find a job. We define
0 < ε ≡ −θq ′(θ)/q(θ) < 1 as the absolute value of the elasticity of the q(θ) function,
so that 1 − ε is the elasticity of the f (θ) function.
2.5 Wage bargaining
When a firm with a vacancy and a job-seeking worker meet, a local monopoly rent is
created by the encounter, which is equal to λiE +λiL, where the superscript i indicates
a particular firm-worker pairing. Upon separation, this rent is lost. The division of the
rent between the worker and the firm is determined by generalized Nash bargaining
over the wage rate:
wi = arg max(λiL)χ (λiE)1−χ , 0 ≤ χ ≤ 1, (17)
where χ and 1 − χ represent the bargaining power of the worker and the firm, re-
spectively. Because all firms are identical, they all choose the same wage.
The wage resulting from the bargaining process can be written in two equivalent
ways:
w = χ α
1 + τE + (1 − χ)
wR − τLa
1 − τL
= χ α + γ θ
1 + τE + (1 − χ)
b − τLa
1 − τL , (18)
where (11) is used to go from the first to the second line. The negotiated wage is a
weighted average of the firm’s surplus—consisting of the marginal product of labor
and the foregone search costs (γ θ ) adjusted for payroll and employment taxes—
and the tax-adjusted unemployment benefit (i.e., (b − τLa)/(1 − τL)). For a given θ ,
it follows from (18) that employers’ tax rates depress wages because they reduce
the surplus of the match, but also because firms and workers save on tax payments
by agreeing to keep wages low. If employers have all the bargaining power, that is,
χ = 0, the negotiated wage is independent of labor market tightness. In that case,
payroll taxes do not affect wage setting. Wage taxes raise the negotiated wage as
long as Assumption 1(ii) is satisfied. Intuitively, because unemployment benefits are
untaxed, the outside option becomes more attractive if wages are taxed more heavily.
For a given labor market tightness, the presence of a tax allowance moderates the
increase in the before-tax wage. Because of increased tax progression, the benefit of
a wage increase is reduced.
3 Solving the model
This section closes the model, presents equilibrium conditions, and develops the
graphical apparatus.
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3.1 Model closure and equilibrium
Asset market equilibrium ensures that household wealth equals the value of outstand-
ing assets, A∗ = A∗P + A∗F, where A∗F denote net foreign assets and asterisks denote
steady-state values. The evolution of net foreign assets is given by the current ac-
count balance: A˙F = rAF + [Y − γV − C], where the term in square brackets is the
trade account showing that domestic output less domestic absorption (i.e., the sum of
consumption and search costs) equals net exports. To the extent that the country is
a net creditor to the rest of the world (AF > 0 initially), it can afford to run current
account deficits in the future. National solvency is retained provided the present value
of current account deficits (the right-hand side of (19)) equals the initial level of net





Y(z) − γV (z) − C(z)]er(t−z) dz. (19)
In steady state, total employment does not change (L˙ = 0), although there are
still labor market flows taking place. From (7), an expression for the equilibrium
unemployment rate can be obtained, that is, u∗ = s/(s +f (θ∗)), where u∗ ≡ U∗/L∗P.
The model can be reduced to two equations and two unknowns (i.e., w∗ and θ∗):
α − w∗(1 + τE) = (r + s)γ θ∗ε, (20)
w∗ = χ α + γ θ
∗
1 + τE + (1 − χ)
b − τLa
1 − τL , (21)
where (20) follows from (3) and noting (16). After a shock, the model immediately
returns to its steady state so that our analysis will be focused on a comparison of
steady states.
3.2 Graphical apparatus
The model can be summarized graphically by two schedules in the (w, θ) space
(Panel (a) of Fig. 1). The vacancy creation (VC) schedule (see (20)) is downward
sloping and convex toward the origin, reflecting diminishing returns in vacancy cre-
ation. A lower wage rate induces firms to create more vacancies. The wage setting
(WS) schedule (see (21)) is linear and upward sloping. At higher rates of labor market
tightness, the worker gets a larger share of the pure rents associated with a labor con-
tract (via a higher wage). The long-run equilibrium is represented by E0. Panel (b) of
Fig. 1 shows the Beveridge Curve (BC), which is downward sloping and convex to the
origin in the (V ,U) space (see Blanchard and Diamond 1989). Intuitively, if there are
more vacancies, unemployment is lower because unemployed household members
find it easier to locate a job. The ray through the origin represents the equilibrium
vacancy-unemployment ratio (i.e., the indicator of labor market tightness (LMT)).
Equilibrium unemployment and vacancies are at the intersection of the LMT and BC
curves.
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Fig. 1 Substituting wage taxes for payroll taxes
4 Allocation effects of labor tax reform
This section analyzes the employment and revenue effects of the labor tax reform
strategy set out in the Introduction. It compares the steady state of the model before
and after the policy shock. The model is log-linearized around its initial steady state,
reflecting the nonlinear nature of the vacancy creation curve (Appendix A.1). Because
of the local approximation, a piecemeal labor tax reform scenario is analyzed.
Consider a labor tax reform strategy which involves simultaneously cutting a pay-
roll tax by dτE < 0 and increasing the wage tax by dτL > 0 so as to leave unaffected
the marginal tax wedge (i.e., dτM = 0). This requires that dτE = −φ dτL, where
φ ≡ (1 + τE)/(1 − τL) > 1 denotes the coefficient of initial taxes. Because of the as-
sumed positive initial wage and payroll taxes, the objective of keeping the marginal
tax wedge constant does not yield an equi-proportionate absolute change in the wage
tax rate. We assume that wages taxes are progressive (i.e., a > 0). The reform then
reduces the average tax wedge and increases the degree of average tax progression
(see (A.7) in Appendix A.2).
In terms of Panel (a) of Fig. 1, the reform shifts up and rotates to the left the WS
curve and shifts to the right the VC curve, thereby pushing up the wage rate. The
new steady state (E1) lies to the north east of the old equilibrium (E0) if the wage
tax is progressive. In that case, the shift in the VC curve dominates the shift in the
WS curve (which can be seen from (A.2) in Appendix A.1). The reform scenario thus
has desirable effects on economic efficiency; it yields a smaller search externality to
job-seeking workers and a higher level of employment in the new steady state. More
formally, labor market tightness changes according to:
dθ∗
dτL
= aφ(1 − χ)f
∗
γ (ε(r + s) + χf ∗) > 0. (22)
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The reform yields a tighter labor market if it satisfies Assumption 2. First, workers
should not have all the bargaining power in wage negotiations. Second, the wage tax
structure should be progressive.
Assumption 2 (i) χ = 1; and (ii) a > 0.
Producer wages fall—increasing the value of an additional worker to the firm—if
workers’ bargaining power is less than perfect. If χ = 1, workers could demand a
wage increase large enough to fully compensate for the wage tax rise, making la-
bor more expensive to firms than for smaller values of χ . In mathematical terms,
dw∗P/dτL = 0 for χ = 1 compared with dw∗P/dτL < 0 for χ < 1 (from (A.10) in Ap-
pendix A.2). Consumer wages rise (for χ > 0), despite the increase in the wage tax,
increasing the household’s labor force participation rate.17 Intuitively, the decrease
in the average tax wedge, τA, raises the negotiated (before-tax) wage sufficiently to
offset the wage tax increase. In mathematical terms, if χ = 1, then dw∗A/dτL = a > 0
and 0 < dw∗A/dτL < a for 0 < χ < 1. Note that dw∗A/dτL = 0 for χ = 0.
















If Assumption 2 is satisfied, employment rises via two channels: (i) increased labor
force participation (the first term of (23)), particularly if the labor supply elasticity is
large; and (ii) a reduction in the unemployment rate (the second term of (23)), ow-
ing to firms opening up more vacancies, thereby making it easier for unemployment
household members to find a job. If labor supply is exogenous (i.e., σ = 0 so that
the first term drops out), employment can still increase via the unemployment rate
channel, but by less, due to the absence of the labor supply effect. In sum, tax pro-
gression is good for employment. But not because of the wealth effect in labor supply
(i.e., households work harder to compensate for the income loss associated with the
higher rate of tax progression), which is stressed in the literature (e.g., Koskela and
Vilmunen 1996). In our model, tax progression benefits employment because the per-
sonal tax allowance of each household member acts as an implicit employment sub-
sidy at the level of the household. The key efficiency result—which is summarized in
Proposition 1—is extremely sharp as it is as close to practicability as one could hope
for.18
Proposition 1 A cut in the payroll tax coordinated with a rise in the wage tax that
keeps the marginal tax wedge unchanged strictly increases labor market tightness,
the before-tax wage rate, employment, and average tax progression iff: (i) the wage
17In contrast, the revenue-neutral reform considered by Koskela and Schöb (1999) fosters employment but
at the expense of workers’ after-tax wages.
18Alternatively, we could have studied a revenue-neutral wage-payroll tax reform as is common in the
literature. Analytically, it is less attractive, however. Under the assumption of a proportional wage tax
schedule, the two tax reform strategies are identical in their economic effects.
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tax schedule is progressive (a > 0); and (ii) workers do not have all the bargaining
power in wage negotiations (χ = 1).
Proof See Appendix A.2. 
What is the effect of the reform on public revenue? Without tax base effects, a
negative revenue effect would materialize. Intuitively, the tax rate on a relatively large
tax base (i.e., the payroll base) is reduced while the tax rate on a relatively small base
(i.e., the wage income base) is increased.19 The reform, however, increases the tax
bases—via higher wages and employment—thereby more than offsetting the nega-
tive tax rate effect. If labor supply is sufficiently inelastic, aggregate unemployment
falls too (see (A.13) in Appendix A.2), causing a fall in unemployment outlays. Ac-
cordingly, net lump-sum transfers, that is, gross public revenue minus unemployment
outlays rise by more than gross public revenue. Proposition 2 summarizes the revenue
effects.
Proposition 2 Cutting a proportional payroll tax while increasing a progressive
wage tax so as to keep the marginal tax wedge constant increases public revenue.
Proof See Appendix A.2. 
Propositions 1 and 2 provide for a surprisingly simple way of reaping the bene-
fits from labor tax reform without jeopardizing the government’s revenue position. If
the wage tax does not provide for an initial allowance (a = 0), a piecemeal reallo-
cation of the distribution of the statutory burden of payroll and wage taxes does not
have an economic effect, just like in a setting of a perfectly competitive labor mar-
ket.20 Revenue is not affected either because the wage tax and payroll tax bases are
equal.
5 Welfare effects of labor tax reform
This section studies whether the reform of Sect. 4 improves welfare. We focus on the
case of an infinitely lived representative household, implying that we cannot study






19Note that, in practice, this is not so clear-cut. Personal income taxes may include certain employment
benefits (e.g., a company car) and exclude certain expenses (e.g., interest payments on a mortgage) from
taxable income, whereas payroll taxes are levied upon salary with few such adjustments.
20Picard and Toulemonde (2001, 2003) show that a revenue-neutral restructuring of payroll and wage
taxes does not affect employment if and only if both producer and consumer wages remain constant and
the labor market is perfectly competitive.
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In view of X∗ = r(A∗ +H ∗), maximizing welfare is equivalent to maximizing house-
hold wealth. Substituting logX∗ into (24) and rewriting:
rΛ∗ = log r + logΩ∗, (25)
where Ω∗ ≡ A∗ +H ∗ and A∗ = A∗P +A∗F. Appendix A.3.1 expresses Ω∗ in terms of
predetermined variables.























r + s + f ∗
(
αωτM + (1 − τMω)τP) − b
]
,
Φ ≡ (χ − ε)α + τP(1 − χ)r + s + εf
∗
r + s + f ∗ ,
τP ≡ (1 + τE)b − τLa1 − τL > 0,
0 < ω ≡ χ r + s + f
∗
r + s + χf ∗ < 1.
Introducing a wage tax in a first-best world—in which initial labor taxes and unem-
ployment benefits are zero (and thus relaxing Assumptions 1 and 2(ii))—does not
yield a first-order welfare effect if the Hosios (1990) condition is met. In formal
terms, τP = 0, Υ = 0, and Φ = (χ − ε)α = 0 (from (26)). The Hosios condition,
χ = ε, says that workers’ bargaining power (χ ) should equal unemployed workers’
effectiveness in finding a job (ε). In that case, all search externalities that characterize
the market outcome are fully internalized. Intuitively, at the margin, the creation of an
additional vacancy creates two externalities. One externality is positive because it be-
comes easier for job-seeking workers to find a job. The other externality is negative,
reflecting the congestion the vacancy-opening firm is imposing on other firms that are
seeking workers. Under the Hosios condition, the two externalities offset each other.
If the bargaining power of workers exceeds its socially efficient level (i.e., χ > ε),
vacancy-creating firms will be under-compensated for their efforts to post vacancies,
yielding a deficient number of vacancies. Conversely, if workers’ bargaining power
falls short of its socially efficient level (i.e., χ < ε), the number of vacancies posted
by firms is excessive. Because the matching technology is Cobb–Douglas, ε is a con-
stant taking on values between zero and unity. In addition, χ is given on the [0,1]
interval. Because of the constancy of these two parameters, the Hosios condition can
be satisfied by accident only. If the conditions set out in Lemma 1 are satisfied, the
market outcome coincides with the socially efficient solution.
Lemma 1 The market solution is efficient if the following two conditions hold:
(i) τE = τL = a = b = 0; and (ii) χ = ε.
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Lemma 1(i) is generally (and also in our case) not satisfied, so that we end up
in a second-best world, which features preexisting labor taxes and unemployment
benefits. We assume τE, τL, a, b > 0. Define χF0 and χ
S
0 as the bargaining power of
workers required to yield a zero welfare change (denoted by “0”) in a first-best world
(labeled by superscript F) and a second-best world (labeled S), respectively. If labor
supply is exogenous, the first term of (26) drops out. In that case, χS ≥ χF0 ≡ ε is a
sufficient condition (and χS > χS0 is a necessary condition) to yield an increase in
welfare (see (27)). Intuitively, progressive labor taxes reduce the effective bargain-
ing power of workers and take the market outcome closer to the first-best optimal
value.21 The smaller wage claim of workers raises employment and output, reduces
unemployment, and diminishes unemployment outlays. Welfare thus rises if aver-
age tax progression rises. More formally, by setting χS = ε in the expression for
Φ = 0, we can see that Φ > 0 (reflecting Assumptions 1(ii)–(iii), which prescribe
b − τLa > 0).22 The argument can be seen more clearly by deriving the optimal
second-best χ , which we call the modified Hosios condition. By setting Φ = 0, we
find:
χS0 ≡
αε(r + s + f ∗) − τP(r + s + f ∗ε)
α(r + s + f ∗) − τP(r + s + f ∗ε) < χ
F
0 ≡ ε. (27)
In contrast to the first-best χ , the second-best χ is a function of tax policy variables
and labor market tightness. We can derive:
∂χS0
∂τP
= −α(1 − ε)(r + s + f
∗)(r + s + f ∗ε)














It can be seen that a more progressive tax system (a larger value of a and thus a
smaller τP) takes the second-best market outcome closer to the first best. A larger
unemployment benefit (a larger b) raises τP and thus reduces the required bargaining
power of workers. If labor supply is endogenous, initial unemployment benefits have
an ambiguous effect on welfare (see (A.30) in Appendix A.3.2). If initial unemploy-
ment benefits are not too large and labor supply is not too elastic, the reform raises
welfare.23 Proposition 3 summarizes the results.
Proposition 3 Substituting a progressive wage tax for a linear payroll tax yields an
increase in welfare if workers have a sufficient amount of bargaining power. If labor
21This point is also made, but in a different context, by Boone and Bovenberg (2002).
22Assumption 1(ii) plays a key role in our welfare analysis. Note that for b = τLa, in which case Assump-
tion 1(ii) is breached, we find Φ = (χ − ε)α. Hence, no welfare gain is realized if the first-best Hosios
condition is met.
23The positive welfare effect disappears if three conditions are met: (i) either Υ = 0 or σ = 0; (ii) τP = 0
(if b = τLa); and (iii) χ = ε.
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supply is exogenous, then χS ≥ χF0 ≡ ε is a sufficient condition and χS > χS0 is a
necessary condition to yield a welfare improvement.
Proof See Appendix A.3.2. 
6 Conclusions
Many European countries face high equilibrium unemployment rates at a time
when their public finances are already overstretched. Policy makers have, therefore,
shifted away their attention from resource-consuming public subsidies to resource-
conserving reforms of the labor tax structure as ways to address the unemployment
problem. The formal theory on labor tax reform offers surprisingly little guidance on
what kind of reform policy makers should embark on to reduce equilibrium unem-
ployment without putting the government’s revenue position at risk. In this context,
the paper has embedded a search and matching model of the labor market in a small
open economy model, featuring endogenous labor supply, progressive wage taxes,
and payroll taxes. With the aid of the model, we study a simple and practical labor
tax reform strategy.
It is shown that a strategy of cutting a proportional payroll tax and increasing a
progressive wage tax so as to keep the marginal tax wedge constant, yields a “dou-
ble dividend” if workers have less than complete bargaining power. It reduces the
equilibrium unemployment rate and increases public revenue. Employment rises be-
cause of the implicit employment subsidy provided by the progressive nature of the
wage tax. Welfare increases if workers have a sufficient amount of bargaining power.
If labor supply is exogenous, a sufficient condition to yield a welfare improvement
is that workers’ bargaining power is greater than or equal to the optimal value of
workers’ bargaining power in a first-best world (as determined by the Hosios con-
dition). The accompanying necessary condition, however, prescribes that the degree
of workers’ bargaining power should exceed its optimal second-best value, which is
smaller than its first-best value. Note that the optimal second-best value of workers’
bargaining depends negatively on unemployment benefits and positively on the tax
exempt threshold. If labor is endogenous, unemployment benefits have an ambiguous
effect on the second-best Hosios condition. If initial unemployment benefits are not
too large and labor supply is not too elastic, welfare rises. The reform, however, does
not affect employment, public revenue, and welfare if the wage tax is proportional.
Our analysis has abstracted, it should be emphasized, from physical capital so that
the income tax applies to labor income only. Allowing for physical capital would
broaden the income tax base. Because of such differences in the income tax base, a
shift from payroll taxes to income taxation would involve an increase in the overall
effective tax burden on capital, thereby favoring labor-intensive production methods.
In that case, a shift in the composition of the tax wedge would have real effects even
if the wage tax is proportional. Further limitations of the analysis stem from ignoring
tax compliance and tax administration issues. Social security contributions are with-
held at source and are, therefore, more difficult to evade than self-assessed personal
income taxes. A shift from payroll taxes to personal income taxes may then possibly
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reinforce the positive employment effects. Finally, we need to investigate how the
equivalence result is affected if unemployment benefits were indexed to wages.24
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Appendix
This Appendix presents the formal analysis underlying the results described in the
main text. First, it analyzes the comparative statics of the labor tax reform scenario.
Second, the welfare effects of the reform are studied.
A.1 Log-linearized system
The vacancy creation curve (20) is nonlinear, and, therefore, the system (20–21) is
log-linearized around the initial steady state (denoted by SS). A relative change of a
variable is denoted by a tilde (˜), for example, θ˜ ≡ dθ/θ , except for τ˜E ≡ dτE/(1+τE)
and τ˜L ≡ dτL/(1 − τL). For convenience, we have dropped the asterisks to denote


























−(1 − χ)φ(b − a)
]
τ˜L +
[ −w(1 + τE)
w(1 + τE) − (1 − χ)φ(b − τLa)
]
τ˜E. (A.2)
By using Cramer’s rule, we can solve the model for θ˜ and w˜, which in turn deter-
mine equilibrium unemployment and vacancies. In deriving the expressions below,
we impose Assumption 1. In addition, the personal tax allowance is strictly positive
(see Assumption 2(ii)).
A.2 Allocation and revenue effects








By setting dτM = 0, (A.3) reduces to
φ dτL = −dτE > 0, (A.4)
where dτE < 0 and φ ≡ (1 + τE)/(1 − τL) > 1. Alternatively, (A.4) can be written as
τ˜L = −τ˜E > 0.
24See Mortensen and Pissarides (2003) for a model that links unemployment benefits to average wages.
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Wages and labor market tightness By substituting (A.4) into the linearized system
of equations (A.1–A.2), we find:
dθ
dτL
= aφ(1 − χ)f
γ (ε(r + s) + χf ) > 0, (A.5)
dw
dτL
= χ(α + γ θ)
(1 + τE)(1 − τL) +
(1 − χ)[χf (b − τLa) + ε(r + s)(b − a)]
(1 − τL)2(ε(r + s) + χf ) > 0, (A.6)
where use is made of (18) in going from the first line to the second line of (A.6).
Equation (A.5) shows that labor market tightness rises as long as Assumption 2 holds.
Because of Assumption 1(ii) the second term of (A.6) is positive.
















· 1 − τL
wP
= −ε(r + s)(1 − χ)(a/w)
ε(r + s) + χf < 0. (A.8)




= χ[ε(r + s) + f ]a
ε(r + s) + χf > 0, (A.9)
dwP
dτL
= −ε(r + s)(1 − χ)(1 + τE)a[ε(r + s) + χf ](1 − τL) < 0, (A.10)
so that the consumer wage increases and the producer wage falls.
Employment and unemployment Differentiating the expression for the steady-state









< 0, f ′(θ) > 0, (A.11)
where the unemployment rate is defined in the usual fashion as the proportion of
job seekers in the labor force, that is, u ≡ U/LP. The change in employment follows
from differentiating L = (1−u)wσR. The latter is derived by substituting U = wσR −L
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If labor supply is exogenous (i.e., σ = 0), the first term drops out. In this case,


















Unemployment is sure to fall if: (i) the labor supply elasticity is zero; (ii) firms have
all the bargaining power; or (iii) search costs are zero.





τE + τL − (a/w)(1 − τL)
1 − τL
]
wL + (τE + τL)L dwdτL
+ [τEw + (w − a)τL] dLdτL , (A.14)
which follows from linearizing the right-hand side of (13). Substituting (A.6) into
(A.14) shows that public revenue unambiguously rises if employment expands:
dR
dτL
= ε(r + s)[1 − τL − (1 − χ)(τE + τL)] + χf (1 − τL)[ε(r + s) + χf ](1 − τL) aL
+ [τEw + (w − a)τL] dLdτL > 0, (A.15)
where ε(r +s)[1−τL −(1−χ)(τE +τL)]+f χ(1−τL) > 0 for reasonable parameter
values, implying that the first term of (A.15) is positive. If all taxes are proportional,
the first and second term are zero.
A.3 Welfare effects
A.3.1 Deriving the welfare function







⇒ rΛ = log r + log[A + H ]. (A.16)
Equation (A.16) says that maximizing welfare is equivalent to maximizing total
wealth, which is defined as Ω ≡ A + H, where H is defined in (9). Total wealth
can be rewritten by using (2), (9), and (11):




αL(z) − γV (z) − σ
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where it should be borne in mind that variables like f (θ) and wR are at their steady-
state values. The term in square brackets on the right-hand side of (A.17) can be
rewritten as:
[·] = (α + γ θ)L − γ θwσR −
σ
1 + σ w
1+σ
R . (A.18)
By using (7), we can write L˙+ (s + f )L = fwσR. Solving this first-order differential
equation yields:
L(z) = [1 − e−(s+f )(z−t)] f
s + f w
σ
R + e−(s+f )(z−t)L, (A.19)
where L is the initial stock of employment. By using (A.18) and (A.19), we can
rewrite (A.17) as:
Ω = AF + 1
r
[
α + γ θ
r + s + f
(
fwσR + rL









Equation (A.20) expresses Ω in terms of the predetermined variables (i.e., AF and L)
and labor market tightness (θ ) for given values of the policy variables.
A.3.2 Comparative statics
Exogenous labor supply If labor supply is exogenous (i.e., σ = 0), (A.20) reduces
to:
Ω = AF + 1
r
[
α + γ θ
r + s + f (f + rL) − γ θ
]
. (A.22)




= 1 − f + rL
r + s + f
[
α + γ θ








r + s + f
[
(α + γ θ)(1 − ε) − γ
q
(r + s + f )
]
, (A.23)
where 1 − ε ≡ θf ′(θ)/f (θ) and f (θ) ≡ θq(θ) are used. The term in square brackets
on the right-hand side of (A.23) is simplified as follows:
[·] = α(1 − ε) − γ
q
(r + s + εf )
= α(χ − ε) r + s + f
r + s + χf + τ
P(1 − χ) r + s + εf
r + s + χf , (A.24)
where the composite preexisting tax rate, τP, is given by:
τP ≡ (1 + τE)b − τLa1 − τL > 0, (A.25)
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where we have used λE = γ /q = (1 − χ)(α − φ(b − τLa))/(r + s + f ) (from (3)
and (18)) to eliminate γ /q in going from the first to the second line of (A.24). By







(χ − ε)α + τP(1 − χ)r + s + εf










Φ ≡ (χ − ε)α + τP(1 − χ)r + s + εf
r + s + f . (A.27)
Setting Φ = 0 yields the second-best Hosios condition:
χS0 ≡
αε(r + s + f ) − τP(r + s + f ε)
α(r + s + f ) − τP(r + s + f ε) . (A.28)
Defining Ξ ≡ χS0 − χF0 gives rise to:
Ξ = − (1 − ε)(r + s + f ε)τ
P
(r + s)(α − τP) + f (α − ετP) < 0, (A.29)
implying that χS0 < χ
F
0 ≡ ε.
Endogenous labor supply In this case, represented by σ > 0, we need to recognize
the endogeneity of the reservation wage, wR. By differentiating (A.20) with respect




= σΥ + qU
r + s + χf Φ, (A.30)
where we have made use of L = fwσR/(s + f ), U = swσR/(s + f ) and (A.21) in
deriving (A.30). Thus, we arrive at (26). The parameter Υ is also defined in (26),







r + s + f Θ, (A.31)
where Θ is defined as
Θ ≡ αfχτ
M
r + s + χf − aΘA − bΘB, (A.32)
where ΘA and ΘB are defined as:
ΘA ≡ τLφf
r + s + f
[
1 − r + s + f




ΘB ≡ (r + s)[(1 − τL)(r + s) + χf (1 + τE) − f (τE + τL)]
(r + s + f )(r + s + χf )(1 − τL) .
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